Verify, Don’t Vouch

The rewards are cents. Is this a joke?

At today's XRD price the tasks on this board pay cents, not wages — every task page shows the dollar figure beside the XRD one, so you can see it before you click. Nothing here is compensation yet. What a task does give you is a real escrow settlement on mainnet that you can verify end to end, and a say in whether this is worth building further.

You say "verify, don't vouch" — can I check the code?

Yes, you can read it: the source is public at github.com/radixguild/guild, under Apache-2.0, the escrow's Scrypto source included. What is not done yet is proving that the package on the ledger, which is compiled code, was built from that source: the reproducible build that would show it is still planned (the backing plan, below). Until it is done, verify behaviour as well as reading the code — every transaction, the component's state, and each public method and who may call it (the auditor's guide lists them). The live escrow package was built before the NftSwap blueprint joined this crate, so a build of today's tree will not reproduce its hash.

Can the operator take the money in escrow?

Not by reaching in. No owner-gated method on the escrow withdraws a task's reward or a live claim bond; the owner's powers are the settings listed above, adding and freezing reward tokens (freezing stops new tasks and touches nothing in flight), and collecting bonds that were already forfeited. Two real powers over funds remain, and you should weigh them: the operator is the only arbiter, deciding the split on a disputed task and able to take an arbiter fee (0 on tasks funded through this app) up to a limit that the same operator, as owner, sets; and the operator can change settings, two of which reach claims already in flight (Known Issues, above).

Claiming costs almost nothing. Can't someone just squat or spam the tasks?

Yes. The claim bond is 10% of the reward with a floor of 76.45 XRD today (an owner setting) — a few cents at today's price — so locking up a task is cheap. An hour after a squatted claim's deadline, anyone can end it, which forfeits the bond and reopens the task. Junk is harder: the contract cannot judge quality and has no reject method — the Reject button on a task page records the poster's decision but moves no money. A poster's only on-chain answer to a junk submission is to raise a dispute inside the 72-hour review window, and the arbiter then has to rule inside the 7-day dispute window — if he does not, the default even split pays the submitter half the reward, and half of their claim bond goes to the poster. If the poster does nothing at all, the contract releases the full reward. So a poster's attention is the real defence, and tasks with an objectively checkable deliverable are the safe ones. That is a real weakness at this price, not a solved problem.

Isn't every task here just the operator paying himself?

Today, yes — it is the first item in the list above. It stops being true the day one person outside the operator completes a task, and that line will be deleted the same day.

Recipes with exact steps: the auditor’s guide.